ABSTRACTThe emergence of dimensional analysis in the early nineteenth century involved a redefinition of the pre-existing concepts of homogeneity and dimensions, which entailed a shift from a qualitative to a quantitative conception of these notions. Prior to the nineteenth century, these concepts had been used as criteria to assess the soundness of operations and relations between geometrical quantities. Notably, the terms in such relations were required to be homogeneous, which meant that they needed to have the same geometrical dimensions. The (...) latter reflected the nature of the quantities in question, such as volume vs area. As natural philosophy came to encompass non-geometrical quantities, the need arose to generalize the concept of homogeneity. In 1822, Jean Baptiste Fourier consequently redefined it to be the condition an equation must satisfy in order to remain valid under a change of units, and the ‘dimension' correspondingly became the power of a conversion factor. When these innovations eventually found an echo in France and Great Britain, in the second half of the century, tensions arose between the former, qualitative understanding of dimensions as reflecting the nature of physical quantities, and the new, quantitative conception based on unit conversion and measurement. The emergence of dimensional analysis thus provides a case study of how existing rules and concepts can find themselves redefined in the context of wider conceptual changes; in the present case this redefinition involved a generalization, but also a shift in meaning which led to conceptual tensions. (shrink)

A re-publication of the whole of the work of Marsilio Ficino, being an impossibility, Kristeller1has presented students with a monumentalSupplementum Ficinianum, in which he brings together everything that was not included in the Basle edition, which he takes for his basis, everything, that is to say, that he has been able to trace in the course of a very thorough search made in numerous Italian and foreign libraries. In a learned introduction there are prefixed to the edition three indexes, of (...) the codices, editions, and works of Ficino, and with each work is given a concise account of its origin, purpose, and fortune in the world. There follows the collection of Ficino's writings, some unpublished, and some having already been published sporadically, but omitted from the Basle edition. The final items are two indexes of proper names quoted in the Basle edition and in theSupplementumrespectively. (shrink)

BenedettoCroce'sbook on history1is the ideal continuation of his earlier book published over a score of years ago on “La Teoria e Storia della storiografia” forming the final part of the “Filosofia dello spirito.” During this long period Croce has had the opportunity to enrich and extend his historiographical experiences with a series of volumes, of which those on the History of Naples, the History of Italy, and the History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century are the most important and have (...) had the widest repercussions. In all this range of experience his fundamental theses on the character and value of history have not been substantially altered. They have actually developed in breadth and depth, so that in the present volume we find them with their characteristic lineaments, old and new together, rendered fuller and more vivid by the rich lymph of the concrete problems of historical life by which they are nourished. In the meantime a series of violent and tumultuous changes, provoking vehement opposing mental reactions, has brought into discussion grave doubts, raised on certain points which first appeared firmly established in the historical view of the world. The antithesis has moved Croce to reaffirm his thought with renewed polemic ardour, thereby throwing it into stronger relief, and giving it a greater sense of reality. (shrink)

BenedettoCroce'sbook on history1is the ideal continuation of his earlier book published over a score of years ago on “La Teoria e Storia della storiografia” forming the final part of the “Filosofia dello spirito.” During this long period Croce has had the opportunity to enrich and extend his historiographical experiences with a series of volumes, of which those on the History of Naples, the History of Italy, and the History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century are the most important and have (...) had the widest repercussions. In all this range of experience his fundamental theses on the character and value of history have not been substantially altered. They have actually developed in breadth and depth, so that in the present volume we find them with their characteristic lineaments, old and new together, rendered fuller and more vivid by the rich lymph of the concrete problems of historical life by which they are nourished. In the meantime a series of violent and tumultuous changes, provoking vehement opposing mental reactions, has brought into discussion grave doubts, raised on certain points which first appeared firmly established in the historical view of the world. The antithesis has moved Croce to reaffirm his thought with renewed polemic ardour, thereby throwing it into stronger relief, and giving it a greater sense of reality. (shrink)

Of late years, even in Italy, no really new personalities or original orientations of thought have made their appearance in philosophy. The best that has been done in our studies consists in ample work consolidating the mental positions already gained during the prewar period, and in slow but unceasing efforts of philosophic thought to permeate the other strata of our culture. It is not paradoxical to affirm that to-day the best fruits of the renewed philosophic education are to be gathered (...) not in books of philosophy, but in books of literary and artistic criticism, of history, and of political and moral science. All this is not merely fortuitous, but proceeds directly and consciously from the trend of the new Italian philosophic thought, which shrinks from isolating itself in an intellectual and fictitious superworld, preferring on the contrary to be a living methodology of the sciences, and to give to its universals the relief and, I might almost say, the savour, of particular things. (shrink)

Shaftesbury is one of those philosophers who are usually placed more or less in the margin of the history of thought because an insufficient idea of system and a certain looseness of conception make it difficult to grasp their ideas and to classify them. Yet when you are able to break down or to dismiss the mental figures in which you have been accustomed to consider the historical succession of doctrines and are prepared to revive their words with an open (...) mind, not only do they give you in their originality more than you had hoped, but also they help to render your representation of intellectual life as a whole more complex and more harmonious in its development. Bandini,1an Italian scholar, in making a zealous study of Shaftesbury, has succeeded in drawing out his rich personality, and at the same time in explaining the importance of his contribution to theperennis philosophia. We could hardly succeed in understanding the modern English mind in its genesis if we concentrated our attention exclusively on those empiristic currents which, although they preponderate in Anglo-Saxon speculation, do not contain all its originality. There is a deep fount of romance in the spirit of this people which wells up from time to time, and the drier and harder the surface earth the more strongly it gushes forth. Shaftesbury is just such a fount, isolated and inexplicable to all outward appearances, but far otherwise for anyone who knows how to penetrate below the surface. In his essay Bandini, while emphasizing the contrast between the philosophy of moral enthusiasm and feeling and the contemporaneous doctrines of Hobbes and Locke, examines with equal penetration the way in which the former becomes reattached to English speculative tradition and by what means it contributes in its turn to furnishing new trends in philosophy. (shrink)

Designer Biology: The Ethics of Intensively Engineering Biological and Ecological Systems consists of thirteen chapters that address the ethical issues raised by technological intervention and design across a broad range of biological and ecological systems. Among the technologies addressed are geoengineering, human enhancement, sex selection, genetic modification, and synthetic biology.

Realist dialetheism is the view that there are contradictions in reality. One argument against this idea says that it is impossible because it has to make room for the possibility of a trivial reality, which is metaphysically impossible. Another argument against it says that the metaphysical structure of reality is such that it is impossible to have contradictions in it. I argue here that both arguments fail to establish the impossibility of realist dialetheism because they are based on a misconception (...) about the notions of negation and contradiction, which leads them, in the first case, to wrongly hold that dialetheism has to be compatible with trivialism, and, in the second case, to assume that the validity of the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction prevents the existence of dialetheias. (shrink)

Die Entwicklungsgeschichte des Lebens in all ihrer Lückenhaftigkeit läßt doch schon ersehen, wie sich der Intellekt kraft ununterbrochenen Fortschritts in aufsteigender Linie, über die Reihe der Wirbeltiere hin bis zum Menschen, herausgebildet hat. Sie zeigt uns in der Fähigkeit des Verstehens einen Ausläufer der Fähigkeit des Handelns, eine immer schärfere, immer mehrgliedrigere, immer geschmeidigere Anpassung des Lebewesens an die gegebenen Existenzbedingungen. Woraus zu folgern wäre, daß unser Intellekt im engeren Sinn des Worts dazu bestimmt sei, die vollkommene Verwebung unseres Körpers (...) in seine Umgebung zu sichern, die Beziehungen der äußeren Dinge aufeinander vorzustellen, kurz: dazu, die Materie zu denken. Und tatsächlich wird dies einer der Schlüsse unserer Arbeit sein. (shrink)

Wie kann es sein, dass im Dunkel bleibt, wer Cyberangriffe lanciert und wessen Kampfdrohnen ganze Länder verwüsten? Band 2 der »Ethik im Drohnenzeitalter« erörtert die Konturen einer Weltgesellschaft, die sich auf die neue Realität des ubiquitären Rechners eingestellt hat. Dies erfordert neue Leitunterscheidungen, z.B. die zwischen News und Fake-News oder ob Codes und Programme für Grenzen sensibilisieren oder desensibilisieren. Angesichts der Entwicklung, dass der soziale Wandel in eine Spirale kommunikationstechnischer Selbstbeschleunigung gerät, gilt es, eine globalisierungstaugliche Ethik zu entwickeln, die dafür (...) sorgt, dass der Einzelne nicht übergangen, sondern gewürdigt wird. (shrink)

Der Dialog ist als Mittel und direkter Ausdruck zwischenmenschlicher Kommunikation in unserer Gesellschaft wichtiger denn je. Zugleich ist er aber zunehmend von Gewalt, von medialen Auswüchsen und von der Schnelllebigkeit unserer Zeit bedroht. Angesichts dieser Entwicklung ist Martin Bubers „dialogisches Prinzip“ hochaktuell. Sein Verständnis des Dialogs unterscheidet sich fundamental vom heutigen medialen Diskurs. In seinem Hauptwerk Ich und Du beschreibt Buber die Grundbedingungen für einen guten Dialog. Ein solcher kann nur gelingen, wenn zwei Menschen bereit sind, sich voll und ganz (...) aufeinander einzulassen und dem anderen ohne Vorbehalte oder Vorurteile zu begegnen. Ausgehend von einer Werk- und einer Werkgeschichtsanalyse von Ich und Du reflektiert Gertud Arnold das Potenzial des Buberschen Dialogkonzepts und dessen praktischer Anwendung im Hier und Heute. (shrink)

Este trabalho tem por objetivo investigar a concepção de fer-ramenta cognitiva no contexto da teoria da cognição incorporada e si-tuada . Para isso, partimos das noções de ferramenta e de tecnologia cognitivas propostas, respectivamente, por Dennett e Dascal , através das quais situam a linguagem no contexto evolu-cionário, ressaltando o seu caráter pragmático. Argumentamos que a concepção de ferramenta cognitiva, que para esses autores está inserida num contexto teórico que privilegia o conhecimento proposicional, pode ser ampliada de modo a abarcar (...) o conhecimento não proposicional. Em seguida, com o propósito de ressaltar a relevância do conhecimento não proposicional, apresentamos algumas teses relativas à natureza dos pro-cessos cognitivos que são postuladas pela CIS e pela Epistemologia Ecológica . Tais teses ressaltam que a compreen-são do comportamento inteligente necessita considerar fatores presentes na complexa dinâmica da interação organismo/meio ambiente. Argu-mentamos, ainda que, graças às teses da CIS e da EE conseguiremos entender alguns fenômenos relacionados à aquisição do conhecimento, es-pecialmente em situações nas quais parece se instaurar uma dicotomia entre significado e ação. (shrink)